Every one of these is a real, verbatim artifact the live service emitted — captured, not written. A signed admission receipt you can decode, a compile that fails closed, an audit chain that catches its own tampering, and a quantum-hardware receipt. Where something isn't live yet, it says so, in the open.
Propose an action; get a deterministic ACCEPT or REFUSE and, on ACCEPT, a signed single-use receipt. Captured from POST /v1/admit on the production service — no signup.
What it proves. The receipt commits to the exact proposal (proposal_hash) under the exact signed ruleset (policy_hash) — verifiable with the public key alone, single-use (jti), expiring in 300s. A REFUSE is terminal and structurally cannot carry a token, and the no-kill floor runs first, above every grant — a lethal action is refused before any permission is even consulted.
barycenters-admit.fly.dev, in shadow mode: the service issues signed decisions but binds nothing (authority_effect = 0). Whether a REFUSE stops a real action is the caller's enforce posture — a human's to turn on.Source: live POST /v1/admit (×3) + GET /readyz, 2026-08-16. Run it yourself →
Write a rule in plain language; Lumen returns an inert candidate boundary — or refuses to emit one. It fails narrower, never wider. Captured from POST /v1/lumen/compile.
What it proves. A clause Lumen can't express (a temporal limit) is not silently dropped — because dropping it would grant more than you wrote. Instead it lands in unmapped, compilable goes false, and no signable packet is produced at all. You can never accidentally sign a boundary broader than your sentence.
authority_effect = 0 — it produces a proposal, binds nothing. Authority enters one point downstream: a human signs the candidate with their own key and POSTs /v1/boundaries.Source: live POST /v1/lumen/compile (×2), 2026-08-16. Mint one →
The service reports its own state truthfully, and every decision is written to a hash-chained, signed ledger that catches its own tampering.
What it proves. Each entry commits to the previous one's hash and is signed over its own — so any edit, reorder, splice, or drop breaks a link or a signature, and the auditor names the first break. A bare self-audit can't see a rolled-back tail; the signed checkpoint, pinned off-box, closes exactly that gap.
/readyz, /v1/audit/checkpoint, /auditz all answer from the deployed service; the ledger is durable (Postgres WORM) and actively growing. The single entry above is a real run of the production write-path with a locally-generated demo key (labelled) — the record shape, not a row from the prod ledger (those aren't exposed over HTTP, by design).Source: live /readyz, /v1/audit/checkpoint, /auditz, 2026-08-16. Verify a receipt →
A receipt whose randomness and non-simulation are anchored to runs on real IBM Quantum processors — and whose integrity you recompute yourself.
What it proves. The nonce is drawn from quantum hardware (127 effective bits, ibm_marrakesh), and a CHSH score of 2.586 > 2 is a correlation no classical system can produce — evidence a real QPU ran, carried by verifiable IBM job IDs. The packet is self-checking: recompute the hash and a tampered field can't survive.
Source: committed proof packet + live hash recomputation, 2026-08-16.
Every specimen above came off the live service or a committed, hash-verifiable proof — captured, never written. The interactive demo runs the same calls against the same endpoints, live in your browser.
authority_effect = 0 · a REFUSE is terminal · every artifact here is real or clearly marked otherwise