deterministic enforcement
AWS — Amazon Bedrock AgentCore (Cedar)
A hyperscaler put deterministic default-deny outside the agent. Cedar decides every tool call at the gateway, forbid-wins — “the same authorization decision for identical requests, regardless of evaluation order or state.”
signed, offline-verifiable decisions
Microsoft — Agent Governance Toolkit
Our receipt, built independently: per-call Ed25519 over RFC-8785 (JCS) canonical payloads, hash-chained by parent hash — “verify them from the command line, no running infrastructure or network access required.”
deterministic enforcement
IETF — External Verifier Contract
The freshest signal is a standard, not a vendor: a fail-closed external verifier returning one verdict — “malformed, timeout, crash → DENY.” That is default-deny /admit written as a wire contract.
deterministic enforcement + signed decisions
APort / Open Agent Passport — Uchibeke
Deterministic pre-action authorization, measured: social-engineering hit 74.6% under a loose policy and 0% across 879 attempts under a strict one — a gate, not a classifier, with a signed record per decision. (Their numbers, not ours.)
deterministic enforcement
Feamster et al. — U. Chicago
A leading networking researcher reframes agent security as ours: the LLM is “inherently nondeterministic and vulnerable to prompt injection” — enforce deterministically, at an external control point.
scoped authority + signed decisions
IETF — Agent Passport System
The IETF is drafting authority that can only narrow: Ed25519 agent passports, delegation that shrinks monotonically across seven dimensions, and a signed-receipt envelope at an enforcement gateway.
signed, replay-verifiable decisions
AgentBound — Kaul, Lan, Gupta
Cryptographically verifiable governance receipts that bind every action to its exact delegation and policy — with independent replay verification. Receipt-exhaust, arrived at independently.
why guardrails aren't enough
Mindgard + Lancaster University
The negative proof: six production LLM guardrails — incl. Azure Prompt Shield, Meta Prompt Guard — evaded up to 100%. Probabilistic guards are evadable; enforcement has to be code.
provenance / verify
Anthropic — under the EU AI Act
Machine-checkable provenance is now law: EU-launched Claude output carries a text watermark + signed C2PA metadata (Article 50 Code of Practice). “Don't trust, verify” is table stakes, not a nicety.